

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 GENEVA 02993

EXDIS

USSALTTWO

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PARM
SUBJECT: MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF FEBRUARY 23, 1978
(SALT TWO-1633)

SEMENOV STATEMENT, FEBRUARY 23, 1978

THE QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN REACHING AGREEMENT ON
ARTICLE II, PAR. 1, OF THE DRAFT PROTOCOL--ON BANNING
NEW TYPES OF ICBMS--HAVE NOW BEEN BEFORE THE DELEGATIONS
FOR A LONG PERIOD OF TIME. THIS IS ONE OF THE MAJOR
REMAINING OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS AT THE ONGOING NEGOTIA-
TIONS.

EFFECTIVE OBLIGATIONS IN THIS AREA ARE TO BE A NEW
IMPORTANT STEP, AIMED AT CURBING THE BUILDUP OF STRATEGIC
ARMS, AT STRENGTHENING STRATEGIC STABILITY AND REDUCING
THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR.

THE SOVIET SIDE'S APPROACH OF PRINCIPLE IS THAT DURING
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THE TERM OF THE PROTOCOL TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW
TYPES OF ICBMS EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS WOULD BE BANNED
EQUALLY FOR BOTH SIDES. IN THIS RESPECT THE POSITIONS OF
THE SIDES COINCIDE. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE EXCHANGE OF
VIEWS HELD, THE USSR DELEGATION TABLED A PROPOSAL ALSO TO
BAN THE TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW TYPES OF ICBMS
EQUIPPED WITH MRVS.

IN ADDITION, THE SOVIET SIDE, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE CONSIDERATIONS SET FORTH IN THE COURSE OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS, PROPOSES THAT ARTICLE II OF THE PROTOCOL PROVIDE FOR A BAN ON FLIGHT-TESTS AND DEPLOYMENT OF ALL NEW TYPES OF ICBMS EQUIPPED WITH A SINGLE REENTRY VEHICLE, EXCEPT FOR ONE NEW TYPE OF ICBM WITH A SINGLE REENTRY VEHICLE FOR EACH SIDE.

AS EXPLAINED, DEVELOPMENT OF ONE NEW TYPE OF ICBM WITH A SINGLE REENTRY VEHICLE IS DICTATED FOR THE SOVIET UNION BY THE NEED TO REPLACE AGING ICBMS WITH SUCH REENTRY VEHICLES, SINCE THEIR REPLACEMENT, PLANNED EARLIER, BY RS-16 AND RS-18 TYPE MISSILES WITH SINGLE REENTRY VEHICLES CANNOT BE CARRIED OUT BECAUSE, CONTINGENT UPON REACHING A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION FOR CRUISE MISSILES, THESE TYPES OF MISSILES WILL BE COUNTED AS DELIVERY VEHICLES EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS.

UNDER THE APPROACH WE HAVE PROPOSED, THE BAN ON EQUIPPING NEW TYPES OF ICBMS WITH MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE REENTRY VEHICLES, ALSO IMPLIES A BAN ON INSTALLING THEREON SELF-CONTAINED DISPENSING MECHANISMS OR OTHER DEVICES, MENTIONED IN THE PERTINENT AGREED STATEMENT TO ARTICLE II, PAR. 5, OF THE TREATY. INSTALLATION ON ANY ICBM WITH A SINGLE REENTRY VEHICLE OF
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SELF-CONTAINED DISPENSING MECHANISMS AND OTHER DEVICES INTENDED FOR MIRVS WOULD ALSO BE BANNED.

THUS, THE SOVIET SIDE'S PROPOSALS FOR ARTICLE II, PAR. 1, OF THE PROTOCOL, INCLUDING THE PROPOSAL TO BAN NEW TYPES OF ICBMS WITH MRVS, CONSTITUTE A MAJOR COMPROMISE INITIATIVE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS, AND PROVIDE A BASIS ON WHICH EFFECTIVE OBLIGATIONS CAN BE WORKED OUT WITH REGARD TO BANNING NEW TYPES OF ICBMS FOR THE TERM OF THE PROTOCOL.

DURING DISCUSSION OF THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE II, PAR. 1, OF THE PROTOCOL THE U.S. SIDE HERE RAISED THE QUESTION OF PROHIBITING "IMPROVEMENTS IN THE CAPABILITIES" OF EXISTING ICBMS. IT IS CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT A BAN, UNDER ARTICLE II OF THE PROTOCOL, ON NEW TYPES OF ICBMS, AND THE QUESTION OF LIMITATIONS ON THE MODERNIZATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, ALREADY AGREED UNDER THE TREATY ARE TWO DIFFERENT QUESTIONS.

LIMITATIONS ON THE MODERNIZATION OF EXISTING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS ARE RECORDED IN THE AGREED PROVISIONS OF

THE DRAFT TREATY, WHICH HAVE BEEN REPEATEDLY CONFIRMED AT THE LEVEL OF GOVERNMENTS AS WELL. THESE PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT TREATY WERE WORKED OUT BY THE SIDES AS A RESULT OF LENGTHY AND THOROUGH DISCUSSIONS, AND ARE FULLY BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY, ENSURING THE BALANCE OF INTERESTS IN THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

THE NEW U.S. PROPOSALS BEING TABLED HERE CONCERNING

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MODERNIZATION OF EXISTING ICBMS ARE CONTRARY TO THE AGREED PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT TREATY, WHILE IN PRACTICAL TERMS, FOR OBJECTIVE REASONS, THEY WOULD HAVE ENTIRELY DIFFERENT CONSEQUENCES FOR EACH SIDE.

THE GROUNDLESSNESS OF SUCH PROPOSALS IS OBVIOUS. THESE PROPOSALS WOULD IN FACT ENCROACH UPON THE NATURAL AND NORMAL ACTIVITIES OF THE SIDES WITH RESPECT TO MODERNIZATION OF EXISTING ICBMS, WHICH ARE PERMITTED UNDER THE TREATY. THE VERY FACT THAT THE SIDES HAVE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS PRESUPPOSES THE POSSIBILITY AND OBJECTIVE NECESSITY FOR THEIR MODERNIZATION, OF COURSE SUBJECT TO COMPLIANCE WITH THE RELEVANT LIMITATIONS ESTABLISHED, WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN STIPULATED IN THE TREATY, AND LIMITED TO THE EXISTING TYPES OF ICBMS THE SIDES HAVE.

FURTHER MEASURES OF QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS OF

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, INCLUDING LIMITATIONS ON THE
DEVELOPMENT, TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW KINDS AND
SYSTEMS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, AND ALSO ON THE
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MODERNIZATION OF EXISTING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WILL
BE THE SUBJECT OF SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS. THE DRAFT
TEXT OF THE JOINT STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES AND BASIC
GUIDELINES FOR SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS ON THE LIMITATION
OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS CONTAINS PROPOSALS OF THE
SIDES ON THIS SCORE, WHICH ARE CLOSE TO EACH OTHER.

ALL THIS ENSURES THE CONTINUITY AND CONSISTENCY OF THE
JOINT EFFORTS OF THE SIDES IN ESTABLISHING LIMITATIONS ON
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IN A QUALITATIVE RESPECT AS
WELL, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND
EQUAL SECURITY.

A CLEAR PROPOSAL HAS BEEN TABLED BY THE SOVIET SIDE
FOR THE DEFINITION OF NEW TYPES OF ICBMS FOR THE PURPOSES
OF THE LIMITATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED IN ARTICLE II OF THE
PROTOCOL. IT SPECIFIES THE YEAR 1976 AS THE BOUNDARY,
AFTER WHICH ALL TYPES OF ICBMS, IF FLIGHT-TESTS OF THESE
MISSILES WERE INITIATED AFTER THAT DATE, WOULD BE
CONSIDERED AS NEW TYPES, BANNED FOR THE TERM OF THE
PROTOCOL. IN OTHER WORDS, ESTABLISHING THE YEAR 1976 AS
THE CUT-OFF POINT, I.E., A TWO-YEAR-OLD DATE, IN THE
DEFINITION OF NEW TYPES OF ICBMS PROVIDES AN EFFECTIVE
AND EFFICACIOUS BARRIER TO A BUILDUP OF STRATEGIC
OFFENSIVE ARMS IN A QUALITATIVE RESPECT.

WE HAVE ALREADY SAID THAT A TIME CRITERION IN CONNEC-
TION WITH LIMITATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED ON STRATEGIC
OFFENSIVE ARMS WAS USED IN ARTICLE II OF THE INTERIM
AGREEMENT, AND, AS YOU KNOW, HAS BEEN SUCCESSFULLY
PROVED IN PRACTICE. PRECISELY SUCH A CRITERION, INVOLVING
ESTABLISHMENT OF A SPECIFIC DATE, IS ALSO USED BY THE
SIDES IN THE AGREED DEFINITION OF MODERN SLBMS IN CONNEC-
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TION WITH ARTICLE II, PAR. 2, OF THE JOINT DRAFT TREATY.
THIS HAD BEEN PROPOSED BY THE U.S. SIDE AND IS AGREED.
THERE IS ALSO MENTION OF A DATE IN THE U.S. DRAFT OF
ARTICLE II, PAR. 1, OF THE PROTOCOL.

IT FOLLOWS FROM ALL THIS THAT THE SOVIET SIDE'S

PROPOSAL ON THIS QUESTION IS FULLY IN ACCORD WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF THE LIMITATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED IN ARTICLE II OF THE PROTOCOL.

A DIFFERENT APPROACH, ONE THAT WOULD INTRODUCE IRRELEVANT ELEMENTS AND WOULD NOT BE CONSISTENT WITH THE TASK OF ENSURING VERIFIABILITY BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION OF THE LIMITATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED, WOULD LEAD TO ARBITRARY AND SUBJECTIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE OBLIGATIONS BEING WORKED OUT IN THIS CONNECTION, WITH ALL THE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES ENSUING THEREFROM. THE RATIONALE HAS BEEN PROVIDED.

THE QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE DEFINITION OF NEW TYPES OF ICBMS IN CONNECTION WITH ARTICLE II, PAR. 1, OF THE PROTOCOL WERE STUDIED FURTHER IN LIGHT OF THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS HELD.

IN ADDITION TO THE SOVIET PROPOSALS ALREADY TABLED IN THIS CONNECTION, THE USSR DELEGATION HAS TO STATE THAT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE LIMITATIONS IN ARTICLE II, PAR. 1, OF THE PROTOCOL, ALSO CONSIDERED TO BE NEW TYPES OF ICBMS WOULD BE ICBMS WHICH HAD THEIR EXTERNALLY OBSERVABLE DIMENSIONS OR THE NUMBER OF THEIR STAGES CHANGED, OR HAD THEIR LAUNCH-WEIGHT OR THROW-WEIGHT INCREASED, OR HAD SUCH CHANGES MADE IN ANY COMBINATION.

IN THIS CONNECTION, PURSUANT TO INSTRUCTIONS, THE USSR DELEGATION PROPOSES AN AGREED STATEMENT TO ARTICLE II,

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PAR. 1, OF THE PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY IN THE FOLLOWING
WORDING:

"AGREED STATEMENT TO PARAGRAPH 1 OF ARTICLE II OF THE
- PROTOCOL

THE PARTIES AGREE THAT NEW TYPES OF ICBMS INCLUDE ALL
TYPES OF ICBMS THE FLIGHT-TESTS OF WHICH WERE INITIATED
AFTER 1976. ALSO CONSIDERED TO BE NEW TYPES OF ICBMS
WOULD BE ICBMS WHICH HAD THEIR EXTERNALLY OBSERVABLE
DIMENSIONS OR THE NUMBER OF THEIR STAGES CHANGED, OR HAD
THEIR LAUNCH-WEIGHT OR THROW-WEIGHT INCREASED, OR HAD
SUCH CHANGES MADE IN ANY COMBINATION."

THE SOVIET SIDE'S PROPOSAL FOR THE DEFINITION OF A NEW
TYPE OF ICBM PROVIDES A CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS UNDERSTAND-
ING OF THE LIMITS AND SCOPE OF THE CORRESPONDING OBLIGA-
TIONS OF THE SIDES. IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE RELEVANT
ALREADY AGREED PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT IT GIVES THE SIDES
EVERYTHING NECESSARY FOR IDENTIFYING ICBMS OF A NEW TYPE
AND FOR VERIFYING BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS COMPLIANCE
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BY THE SIDES WITH THE CORRESPONDING OBLIGATIONS.

THE USSR DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT THE SOVIET SIDE'S
NEW PROPOSAL IN CONNECTION WITH THE DEFINITION OF NEW
TYPES OF ICBMS PROVIDES A BASIS FOR WORKING OUT A
MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION FOR ARTICLE II, PAR. 1, OF
THE PROTOCOL. EARLE

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